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Introduction 
 
This paper explores the concept of 'normative power Europe' through the framework of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is a central preoccupation of those analysts and policymakers interested in 
the EU's normative power. A recent special issue on normative power in Europe was framed 
around the question of how to define normative power in order to enhance its legitimacy as a 
form of foreign policy. In that issue, Michael Smith noted that from whatever angle we study the 
question of the EU's foreign policy, "the subject raises major questions about the interaction 
between internal developments and external structures and processes, about the boundaries of 
'civilian' and normative power, and about the legitimacy claims of European foreign policy".
1 Ian 
Manners recently listed no less than five definitions of normative power developed in order that 
the legitimacy of the EU's actions be judged according to an objective standard of some kind.
2 An 
ongoing research project inquires into whether or not European norms appear as legitimate in the 
eyes of non-Europeans.
3  
 
This paper starts off by situating the emergence of normative power Europe within the wider 
context of European integration. Various conceptions of the EU as a foreign policy actor were 
developed in an attempt to resolve a crisis in the 'Idea of Europe' that began in the early post Cold 
War period. The specific concept of normative power emerged in reaction to the perceived 
inadequacy of various other qualifying adjectives for European power. For all its popularity, the 
concept has been subject to criticism ever since Ian Manners first published his seminal article in 
2002. Many felt that the very idea of normative power Europe needed its own sources of 
legitimacy: scholars and analysts refused to accept that the prefix 'normative' should 
automatically put the EU's power beyond critical commentary. As a result, in the academic debate 
scholars have focused on possible sources of legitimacy external to the normative power concept 
itself. This paper analyzes in detail three such sources: cosmopolitan law as argued by Helene 
Sjursen, a post-colonial ethos developed by Kalypso Nicolaïdis, and a set of European social 
preferences elaborated by Zaki Laïdi. The paper claims that each of these attempts to legitimize 
the concept of normative power draw upon different concepts of political community, authority 
and democracy. This is instructive in terms of our understanding of the EU as a political 
formation. It also demonstrates that definitions of normative power are never neutral - they put 
forward a particular vision of politics which should be properly identified. The paper compares 
these sources of legitimacy and limns their weaknesses. The paper concludes with the suggestion 
                                                 
* This paper is a reworked version of a chapter of a doctoral thesis exploring the ways in which the EU 
legitimizes its foreign policy.  
1 Smith, M. 2006. Comment: Crossroads or cul-de-sac? Reassessing European Foreign Policy. Journal of 
European Public Policy. 13(2): 322-327. p326, my italics. 
2 These five are the EU as self-binding, as a vanishing mediator, as deliberation, as reflexivity and as 
inclusion. Manners, I. (2007). European Union, normative power and ethical foreign policy. In D. 
Chandler, and V. Heins (Eds.), Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes. 
Abingdon: Routledge. p119. 
3 On the connection between legitimacy and normative power, Nicolaïdis writes in a book on the EU's 
Mediterranean policies that "one may read a number of contributions in this volume as supporting the 
assumption that taking the EU as a 'normative power' provides a response to the effectiveness/legitimacy 
dilemma, making the EU's assertion of its influence more palatable and legitimate, and distinct from that of 
the United States" Nicolaidis, K., and Nicolaidis, D. (2006). The EuroMed beyond Civilizational 
Paradigms. In E. Adler, B. Crawford, F. Bicchi, and R.D. Sarto (Eds.), The Convergence of Civilizations: 
Constructing a Mediterranean Region. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p8.  This project on Europe in 
a Non-European World is part of the EU-funded Garnet project on global governance, regionalization and 
regulation. Information on Garnet can be obtained via its website: http://www.garnet-eu.org/   3 
that the lack of clarity concerning the identity of the EU as a political formation may be one of 
the major limitations the EU faces in its hope of becoming a central actor in world politics. 
 
1. Europe as a "force for good"  
 
Two features of the post Cold War period stand out in the discussion of normative power Europe. 
The first is a crisis in the 'Idea of Europe', which has been around since the early post Cold War 
period. The second is the increasing centrality of foreign policy to European integration, and the 
vastly expanded role of the EU in the area of foreign affairs. These two developments are 
connected: we can point to the expansion of the EU's international role, and the attempts at 
identifying its distinctive contribution to world affairs, as driven in part by the need to legitimize 
European integration in the post Cold War period. As Kalypso Nicolaïdis has argued: "Europeans 
are currently seeking for a new raison d'être for their continental project and many share the 
belief that such a raison d'être lies with its role in the world".
4 
 
Rarely has there ever been any consensus around the 'Idea of Europe'.
5 However, during the Cold 
War, various narratives underpinned European integration: Europe as a peace project, economic 
prosperity through integration, an integrated Europe as an anti-communist bulwark. Over the last 
couple of decades, the force of these narratives has waned. Anti-communism withered away with 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Few alive in Europe today lived through the World Wars. The 
heady days of the postwar economic boom (les Trentes Glorieuses) have long been replaced by 
more moderate growth and by long-standing concerns about European competitiveness.
6 More 
problematically, a veritable ideology of European integration - functionalism - was unable to 
justify the forward movement of the EU in the 1990s. Functionalism rests upon a technical 
rationale for integration, that cooperation in one area will beget further cooperation elsewhere by 
virtue of its own internal necessity. This fails as a historical account of European integration, but 
also does not give integration any deeper meaning or purpose. The contemporary crisis in the 
'Idea of Europe' is, as Stefan Elbe has shown, above all a crisis in meaning. Elbe writes of the 
"pessimism that is frequently displayed by contemporary scholars and policy-makers in response 
to the perceived absence of a more meaningful vision of Europe".
7 Significantly, in the post Cold 
War period, we have seen a shift away from functionalism towards attempts to give the EU a 
more cultural identity.
8 This is driven in part by the awareness that the expansion of the EU into 
more politically sensitive areas of policymaking cannot be justified by wholly institutional 
arguments. As one scholar put it, "a political entity such as the European Union is inconceivable 
without the existence of a collective identity for its citizens".
9 However, for all the energy 
expended in providing the EU with an identity of some kind, the result has been meagre. As Elbe 
                                                 
4 Nicolaidis, K. (2007). The 'Clash of Universalisms' (Or Why Europe Needs a Genuine Post-Colonial 
Ethos). Paper presented at Faculty Seminar in Oxford. pp5-6. 
5 See, for instance, Mazower, M. (1998). Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century. New York: 
Vintage. and Judt, T. (2005). Postwar. London: Heinemann. Especially chapter thirteen. See also 
d'Appollonia, A.C. (2002). European Nationalism and European Union. In A. Padgen (Ed.), The Idea of 
Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
6 For a defence of Europe's role in the world economy, see Hutton, W. (2002). The World We're In. 
London: Little, Brown. 
7 Elbe, S. 2001. 'We Good Europeans...': Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe. Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies. 30(2): 259-283. p259. 
8 There is an extensive debate on whether this is possible or not, and if possible whether it is in fact 
desirable. See, for a range of views, Smith, A.D. 1992. National Identity and the idea of European unity. 
International Affairs. 68(1): 55-76.and Laffan, B. 1996. The Politics of Identity and Political Order in 
Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies. 34(1): 81-102. 
9 Jacques Vandamme, cited in Elbe, ibid, p264.    4 
remarks, "the growing debate on the European idea has… not so much culminated in the 
articulation of a more compelling vision of Europe as it has in a plethora of accounts of a culture 
unable to articulate a meaningful vision of itself".
10 As Agnes Heller put it, "European culture… 
can legitimately be considered the cadaver of its own self-image".
11 
 
Under such conditions, it has been tempting to turn away from internal integration and to try and 
find meaning in the EU's international role. Many factors of course explain the expansion of the 
EU's role. External events, from the wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s to the American war in 
Iraq in 2003, have often pushed member states towards closer foreign policy cooperation. An 
internal fixation with finding a purpose for the EU has, however, played its part, explaining why 
EU foreign policy resembles - to use Michael Smith's phrase - a "politics of self-absorption".
12 
This began already in the late 1980s, with then president of the European Commission, Jacques 
Delors, discerning in the collapse of the Eastern bloc an opportunity for the EU to take on new 
responsibilities.
13 George Ross writes that Delors, since 1989, "had been training himself in 
imitable Jansenist ways in world statesmanship, whiles seizing every opportunity to advertise the 
Community as an international player".
14 Though expectations of the EU's role often outstripped 
its ability to act effectively
15, EU foreign policy has become a central theme of integration. In 
recent years, we have seen this most vividly in the cottage industry of scholars and analysts 
working on inventing adjectival prefixes for the concept of European power. We have, inter alia, 
civilian/civilized/civilizing/civilizational power
16, quiet superpower
17, postmodern superpower
18, 
neo-medieval empire
19, responsible power
20 and even metrosexual power.
21 Manners' own 
concept of normative power was developed as a response to some of these terms and the ensuring 
debates. Manners claims that the concept of civilian power Europe was tied to the Cold War and 
                                                 
10 Elbe, op cit, p265. 
11 Elbe, op cit, p265. For further accounts of the EU's problematical search for meaning in the post Cold 
War period, see Laidi, Z. (2001). Un Monde Prive de Sens. Paris: Hachette., Hoffmann, S. (1995). 
Obstinate or Obsolete? France, European Integration and the Fate of the Nation State. In S. Hoffmann 
(Ed.), The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994. Boulder: Westview Press. and Ash, T.G. 
(1999). History of the Present. London: Allen Lane/Penguin. 
12 Smith, op cit, p326. 
13 On the origins of the EU's role in the enlargement brief, see Nuttall, S. (2000). European Foreign Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. p6. See also McCormick, J. (2007). The European Superpower. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p114. 
14 Ross, G. (1995). Jacques Delors and European Integration. Cambridge: Polity. p92 
15 On this problem, see Hill, C. 1993. The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's 
International Role. Journal of Common Market Studies. 31(3): 305-328. 
16 For a discussion of these terms, see Manners, I. 2006. Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the 
crossroads 1. Journal of European Public Policy. 13(2): 182-199. p184. On the original concept of civilian 
power Europe, see Duchene, F. (1972). Europe's Role in World Peace. In R. Mayne (Ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: 16 Europeans look ahead. London: Fontana. and Duchene, F. (1973). The European 
Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence. In M. Kohnstamm, and W. Hager (Eds.), A Nation 
Writ Large? Foriegn Policy Problems before the European Community. Basingstoke: Macmillan.. For a 
critique of Duchene, see Bull, H. 1982. Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 21(2): 149-164.. 
17 Moravcsik, A. (2004). Europe is the new role model for the world, Financial Times. London. 
18 McCormick, op cit, pp27-33. 
19 Zielonka, J. 2001. How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European union. Journal of Common 
Market Studies. 39(3): 507-536. and Zielonka, J. (2006). Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged 
European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
20 Mayer, H., and Vogt, H., Eds. (2006). A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External 
Affairs Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
21 Parag, K. (2004). The Metrosexual Power, Foreign Policy. Vol. JulyAugust.   5 
had neo-colonial overtones. It was too closely associated with fixed assumptions about the nation-
state, national interests and the role of military power. In Manners' words, "the EU and its actions 
in world politics demand a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect on what it is, 
does and should do".
22 His concept of normative power was designed to respond to this demand. 
  
2. The limits of normative power Europe  
 
For all its popularity, it became obvious very quickly that the prefix normative does not 
automatically make the EU a legitimate actor in international affairs. Since Manners' published 
his article in 2002, the debate around defining and judging the EU's normative power has grown 
and the critiques of normative power Europe have come from a variety of different sources. A 
particular concern was the close correspondence between normative power and the EU's vision of 
itself, which made many uneasy. In Helene Sjursen's words, "the fact that [normative power 
Europe] corresponds very closely to the EU's own description of its international role could be 
enough to set the alarm bells ringing".
23 Adrian Hyde-Price has echoed Sjursen's concerns. In his 
view, a problem with normative power is that "when the object of study is seen as embodying the 
core values one believes in, it is difficult to achieve any critical distance".
24 Another set of 
concerns have come from the growing militarization of the EU. This has pushed scholars towards 
a sharper definition of normative power which has proven contentious. Does it mean civilian 
power? If so, do the rise of ESDP and the beginning of military missions out of area and outside 
of NATO (Artemis in 2003) signal the end of the EU's normative project?
25 If normative power is 
not synonymous with civilian power, what does it mean exactly? Sjursen suggests that there is an 
inevitably coercive element to normative power i.e. the 'power' part must refer to something. As 
was obvious from the humanitarian intervention debates: an ethical foreign policy requires 
military hardware in order for ethical choices to be properly executed. Powerlessness inhibits 
acting normatively.  The role of the US has also posed a problem for the concept of normative 
power. Robert Kagan's critique of normative power Europe was based around the idea that it 
made a virtue out of a necessity. Has the EU really chosen to be Kantian, he asked, or is it 
Kantian only because the US is resolutely Hobbesian?
26 Another important development 
challenging the concept of normative power was the rise of 'neoconservativism' in the US, 
interpreted by many as a remoralization of US foreign policy. Thomas Diez drew the conclusion 
that the US was as much of a normative power as the EU.
27 But if the US is a normative power, 
then normative cannot be synonymous with good, unless we agree with neoconservative 
interventionism. If we want to keep the term 'normative', some kind of differentiation between 
good and bad norms would seem essential. This has been Sjursen's response, who has argued for 
greater theoretical and empirical clarification of what standards we can use to judge the 
'normativity' of the EU's power.  
 
This paper focuses on three responses to the normative power Europe concept as originally 
formulated. These are Helene Sjursen's focus on cosmopolitan law, Kalypso Nicolaïdis' idea of a 
                                                 
22 Manners, op cit, p184. 
23 Sjursen, H. 2006. The EU as 'normative' power: how can this be? Journal of European Public Policy. 
13(2): 235-251. p235. 
24 Hyde-Price, A. Ibid.'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique. 217-234. p218. 
25 This is the kind of argument put forward by Karen Smith. See Smith, K. (2005). Still 'civilian power 
EU?' European Foreign Policy Unit Working Papers. London. Accessible at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EFPUworkingpaperseries.html 
26 Kagan, R. (2003). Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. London: Atlantic 
Books. 
27 Diez, T. 2005. Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power'. Millenium. 
33(3): 613-636.   6 
post-colonial ethos, and Zaki Laïdi's attention to social preferences. The paper seeks will draw 
out the understanding of legitimacy that each of these three scholars have, and what light these 
understandings can shed on the nature of the EU as a political formation. Interestingly, each 
provides a very different picture of the political community to whom the EU's norms should be 
legitimized. This diversity is itself illustrative of the fact that there is little consensus around the 
nature of political responsibility and accountability in European foreign policy. The final part of 
the paper will draw out this argument, suggesting that a useful way of understanding both the 
nature and political limits of Europe's normative power is in terms of its sources of legitimacy 
and their respective weaknesses. 
 
2.1. The legitimacy of cosmopolitan law 
 
In her 2006 article on Europe's normative power, Sjursen explores the limits of two popular 
definitions of normative power: as 'civilian power' and as a pursuit of values and norms rather 
than interests. Equating normative power with civilian power leaves us with the same problem 
confronted by promoters of ethical foreign policy: are there not instance where coercive (i.e. non-
civilian) measures are needed in order to defend or to promote a certain set of ethical standards? 
As Sjursen puts it, "the criticisms of the EU's role in the crises in former Yugoslavia… suggest 
that, for a putative 'normative' power, the incapacity to act is considered by many to be as 
problematic as the capacity to act".
28 Alternatively, focusing on the EU as a promoter of norms 
rather than interests cannot differentiate the EU from many other actors in the international arena. 
Many foreign policy goals are couched in normative terms. Sjursen argues that the problem lies in 
establishing whether or not these normative claims are merely self-interest dressed up as 
something else. She asks, "how to we know that 'normative power' Europe is not simply an 
expression of Eurocentric imperialism?" It is not good enough to point to norms; instead, "we 
must… be able to discriminate between different types of norms and their legitimacy and 
validity".
29 
 
This concern with the legitimacy of norms goes back to Sjursen's earlier work on EU 
enlargement. Writing in 2002, she explored how the EU legitimizes its Eastward expansion. 
Sjursen's starting point was that "the arguments and reasons provided in favour of enlargement 
have to be of a type that others can support: they must be considered legitimate".
30 Sjursen gave 
three justifications for EU enlargement, corresponding to three sources of legitimacy: a pragmatic 
justification locating legitimacy in utility; an ethical-political justification where legitimacy 
resided in a common set of values and a shared European identity; and a moral justification 
drawing legitimacy from an attachment to an abstract set of universal rights. In her empirical 
analysis of elite discourse on enlargement, Sjursen found that only the ethical-political 
justification could make sense of two features of enlargement: its normative rather than interest-
based dynamic; the way in which applicant countries were not treated equally e.g. Poland 
favoured over Turkey. Sjursen's conclusion was that enlargement was driven by a sense of shared 
kinship between Western and Central Eastern Europe. The normative dynamic was therefore 
couched within a particularistic culturally-bound understanding of European identity. 
 
In approaching the question of the EU's normative power, Sjursen argues that such partiality 
cannot be considered legitimate. It transforms norms into expressions of cultural bias. What is 
needed instead is an understanding of norms that have a universal - as opposed to particularistic - 
                                                 
28 Sjursen, op cit, p239. 
29 Sjursen, op cit, p242. 
30 Sjursen, H. 2002. Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement 
Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies. 40(3): 491-513. p493.   7 
content. Following cosmopolitan theorists, and the work of Jürgen Habermas in particular, she 
focuses on the rationality of norms, that is to say those norms that can be openly debated - and 
perhaps rejected - in a rational interchange of views.
31 Sjursen's question to the EU, in order to 
determine the legitimacy of its norms, would be: "does the EU, in its external action, refer to 
reasons that can be expected to gain approval in a free and open debate in which all those affected 
are heard?"
32 The most obvious way in which we could observe this in practice would be whether 
or not the EU adheres to a set of rules that are common to all. As she puts it, "the law functions as 
a system of action that makes it possible to implement moral duties or commitments"
33; therefore, 
"to 'act in a normative way' would be to act in accordance with legal principles".
34  
 
This focus on law obviously presents a problem. International law can as easily be derived from 
interests as from norms. Only a blanket Kelsenian assumption would equate law with norms. 
Sjursen recognizes this by differentiating between conventional multilateralism - an interest-
based framework which rests upon the formal equality of sovereignty states - and a cosmopolitan 
legal system that aims to protect the rights of individuals, not the sovereign rights of states. 
Sjursen argues - drawing on Axel Honneth - that a transformation of international power politics 
is underway, towards a more cosmopolitan order.
35 The EU's normative power should be judged 
according to whether it promotes this transformation, and not in terms of its ability to inscribe 
itself into the existing international legal system.
36 A similar argument is made by Erik Eriksen, 
who claims that "it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher ranking law - to human rights and 
criteria of justice - that the EU can qualify in normative terms".
37 A legitimate foreign policy for 
the EU, according to Eriksen, is one which underscores the cosmopolitan law of the people. 
 
This argument paints a picture of EU policy legitimized by a global community. As Manners has 
argued, Sjursen et al eschew "communitarian cultural identity" in favour of "rights-based 
normative justifications".
38 It is only when the EU can act in the name of an abstract universal 
humanity that Sjursen et al feel that it can escape the charge of bias and hypocrisy. The political 
community which is the source of legitimacy for the EU's normative power is therefore a global 
community of individuals, rather than any territorially bounded entity. Normative power Europe 
can be genuinely normative only if it is not European. In terms of legitimacy, Sjursen et al clearly 
assume that the more an action can be justified in terms of humanity as a whole, the more it will 
be perceived as legitimate. Legitimacy lies in the universal standards according to which an 
action is judged. This places Sjursen et al. firmly in the camp of cosmopolitan political theory. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 On Habermas, Andrew Linklater argues that Habermasian norms "cannot be valid unless they can 
command the consent of everyone whose interests stand to be affected by them". Therefore, "the validity of 
principles can only be established through forms of dialogue which are in principle open to every human 
being". Linklater, A. (1998). Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State. In D. 
Archibugi, D. Held, and M. Kohler (Eds.), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan 
Democracy. Oxford: Polity Press. p122. 
32 Sjursen, 'The EU as 'normative power'', op cit, p243. 
33 Sjursen, 'The EU as 'normative power'', op cit, p244. 
34 Sjursen, 'The EU as 'normative power'', op cit, p245. 
35 For an extended critique of this sociological claim, see Chandler, D. (2004). Constructing Global Civil 
Society: Morality and Power in International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Part one. 
36 Sjursen, 'The EU as 'normative power'', op cit, pp247-248. 
37 Eriksen, E. 2006. The EU - a cosmopolitan polity? Journal of European Public Policy. 13(2): 252-269. 
p253. 
38 Manners, op cit, p120.   8 
2.2. The legitimacy of the non-European Other 
 
In a recent contribution to the debate on normative power Europe, Kalypso Nicolaïdis is 
concerned with the legitimacy of the EU's norms (its "universalist discourse") "in the eyes of the 
rest of the world".
39 Picking up on a tendency in the recent debate to assert the EU's norms 
against those of the US (the "clash of universalisms"), Nicolaïdis argues that what is lost in 
attacking the "American other" is "the desire to appeal to non-American others".
40 Rather than 
define itself in terms of the contemporary US, Nicolaïdis argues that the EU should ground its 
norms in its own history and in opposition in particular to the colonial content of that history. In 
her words, the EU's normative power "ought to be based on the structural reality of what the EU 
is internally, a federal union of states, combined with full accounting of the colonial past of its 
members".
41 What the EU can really contribute to international affairs is "post-colonial wisdom 
or guilt".
42 In a chapter on the EU's Mediterranean programs, Nicolaïdis writes that "European 
unease with power is part and parcel of a compelling narrative still in the making: that of a Union 
of nation-states slowly and painfully constructing together the instrument of their collective post-
colonial atonement".
43 
 
In specifying the source of legitimacy for this particular brand of European universalism, 
Nicolaïdis argues that the best judges are not the citizens of Europe, but rather "the citizens of the 
rest of the world". Legitimacy of the EU's normative power is rooted in the judgement of the non-
European other. Nicolaïdis's understanding of post-colonial European universalism tries to situate 
it within other non-European universalist discourses. Being "cogniscent of the universalism of 
others" would make the EU's normative power "truly post-colonial".
44 This is a vision which 
brings "the other back in" and recognizes that the EU's does not have a single story to tell about 
itself. In Nicolaïdis' view, the EU is not born out of singularity, but rather out of its diversity: "the 
EU's real comparative advantage lies less in engineering convergence among its members' 
policies and more in its capacity to manage enduring differences between nations. At its core, the 
EU is about institutionalizing tolerance between states".
45 Asking what exactly a post-colonial 
ethos would look like, Nicolaïdis proposes a kind of Levinasian ethics of Other-regardedness, 
where the EU effaces itself as a subject of history in order to avoid objectifying others. Levinas 
believed that responsibilities to the Other should prevail over the freedom of the Self.
46 A post-
colonial ethos would "accompany the proclamation of fundamental rights with a story about how 
we ourselves have historically trampled on these rights, displaying a self-reflective and self-
critical attitude rather than a claim to universality". Nicolaïdis has developed this idea in the 
context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). She argues that EMP ought to be 
reconfigured in line with a post-colonial agenda, with an emphasis on shared ownership, 
empowerment and an ethics of responsibility.
47 On the future of European and American 
universalisms, Nicolaïdis hopes that "they will be evanescent universalisms, making room for 
                                                 
39 Nicolaïdis , op cit, p1. 
40 Nicolaïdis , op cit, p2. 
41 Nicolaïdis , op cit, p2. 
42 Nicolaïdis , op cit, p3. 
43 Nicolaïdis , 'The EuroMed', op cit, p8. Note that all page numbers for this book chapter are taken from 
the version of the chapter accessible from Kalypso Nicolaïdis ' webpage. See 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/kNicolaïdis /publicationsbyauthor.html#DN. Accessed on 7 May 2007. 
44 Nicolaïdis , 'The Clash of Universalism, op cit, p5. 
45 Nicolaïdis , 'The Clash of Universalism, op cit, p19. 
46 Chandler, D. (2007). The Other-regarding ethics of the 'empire in denial'. In D. Chandler, and V. Heins 
(Eds.), Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes. Abingdon: Routledge. 
p164. 
47 Nicolaïdis , 'The EuroMed', op cit, pp19-23   9 
other visions to compete in an emerging global public sphere, where universalist narratives can 
no longer be conjured up unilaterally but must be the product of an international society where 
the taming of power encompasses the power of hegemonic ideas".
48 
 
Based on this reading of the EU's normative power, what understanding of the EU as a political 
community emerges from Nicolaïdis' preference for the post-colonial ethos? She identifies a 
tension between normative power as conventionally understood and the building of what she 
believes is the right kind of political community. Sticking with the example of the Euro-
Mediterranean region, Nicolaïdis writes that  
 
The EU's use of its normative power consists in the mobilization of instruments to affect the 
convergence of norms determining domestic conditions that ought in turn to be more propitious to 
stability in the region. But the logic is first and foremost that there are EU and non-EU members, 
that the community must be inclusive but that the EU is the one that defines normative 
appropriateness. It is fair to ask then under what conditions this other kind of logic of power can 
favour the emergence of a sense of 'we-ness'".
49 
 
If the EU's normative power involves building up new dividing lines between Northern Europe 
and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, and if the EU monopolizes the content of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, then the EU's normative power will have lost its legitimacy. 
Nicolaïdis argues that the EU must overcome both the monist and dualist understandings of the 
Euro-Mediterranean project that have dominated up until now. The monist vision focuses on the 
creation of a shared identity of EuroMed partners; the dualist vision sees the EMP as a 
mechanism for bridging North and South differences. Nicolaïdis styles this "the impossible 
choice between colonial nostalgia and integrative utopia".
50  
 
Her preferred alternative is to "give substance to the idea of a de-territorialized Mediterranean 
identity", which would build upon a "shared experiential basis for engaging in common projects 
for the future". Such an identity can be built up in two ways: through history, and through 
recognition of the mutual interaction and mutual dependence of all actors in the Mediterranean 
region. European atonement for its colonial past is crucial. Nicolaïdis writes that 
 
European ex-colonial powers need to acknowledge more explicitly the fact that present relations 
with their Southern neighbours are conditions by their colonial heritage… Rebuilding ties among the 
people of the EuroMediterranean space requires uncovering this repressed knowledge and turning 
the subsequent emerging representation of the past into leverage for change in the present.
51 
 
Substantively, the 'actually existing' Euromed community that should be acknowledged and 
celebrated is based upon cultural interpenetration and the reality of Southern modernization via 
Northern methods. In Nicolaïdis' words, "the double process of penetration and influence, from 
North to South and from South to North, has already given a certain coherence to the 
EuroMediterranean region, understood not as a material space but as a new dimension of the 
European construction with its own proper dynamic".
52 The picture of the political community 
that serves to legitimize the EU's normative power is one that is overwhelmingly de-
territorialized, that transgresses existing boundaries, is constituted by the movement of peoples 
and the transnational nature of beliefs. It is grounded not in the exclusivity of the national self but 
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the inclusivity of a multiplicity of selves that recognize in others key features of their own past 
and present. Nicolaïdis argues that such a political community is as relevant for legitimizing the 
EU's normative power in the EuroMed region as it is for legitimizing the EU in general. In both 
the case of the EU and the EuroMed region, "a Community can only be progressively built 
through the mutual confrontation and accommodation of separate but intertwined identities".
53 In 
neither case is the emergence of a single identity either realistic or even desirable. 
 
Nicolaïdis' understanding of normative power and of its legitimacy through the building of a de-
territorialized political community has in fact much in common with postmodern theorists of 
Europe and European identity. Stefan Elbe's use of Nietzsche and his notion of the "good 
European" resemble Nicolaïdis' own conception of Europe as a constellation of different stories 
and experiences. Elbe writes that "a genealogy of contemporary European pessimism seeks to 
suggest that it might not be at all necessary to articulate a common and overarching idea of 
Europe in order to demonstrate one's spiritual vitality as a 'good European'".
54 For Nietzsche, the 
modern experience of meaninglessness - currently experienced in Europe as a crisis in the idea of 
Europe - should be taken as a sign of increased vitality: "there is no prima facie reason", writes 
Elbe, "why there should be a greater meaning underlying all events". For Nietzscheans, 
meaninglessness - or multiple meanings - means freedom and liberation from the burden of 
Europe's endless search for meaning. Elbe concludes that  
 
what Nietzsche's notion of the 'good European' also suggests for our contemporary thinking… is that 
being a good European might well reside in resisting altogether the debate on the meaninglessness of 
the European idea and the concomitant desire to articulate an overarching idea of Europe 
commensurate with the times.
55 
 
In his own account of Elbe's argument, Manners draws out the vision of the political community 
that underpins the postmodern contribution to understanding the EU's normative power. In Jean 
Baudrillard's vision, the EU should strive to maintain its claim to universality but without 
rebuilding the boundaries and barriers of European chauvinism. According to Manners, 
"Baudrillard is fairly lucid in arguing that the EU runs the risk of developing into a 'transnational 
pseudo-federation' which re-particularizes culture, conscience and identity".
56 Jacques Derrida's 
message is that "Europeans and the EU have a responsibility towards memory which must 
manifest itself as a cosmopolitan response towards others". The image here is of a political 
community that is self-effacing - it does not assert itself as a subject but instead defines itself in 
terms of its duties to those outside of the political community. At the same time, the postmodern 
political community is positively defined by flux and by uncertainty over what constitutes the EU 
culturally, politically and socially. Manners paints from postmodern writings a political 
community "without finality, that is not fixed in time or space". He goes on to say that "the 
ambiguous nature of the EU's normative power seems to fulfil this open heading - is normative 
power Europe instrumental or ideological? Is it an actor or a structure? Is it a union of citizens or 
states? Is the Constitution for Europe the first or final constitution?"
57 Such visions correlate with 
the postmodern image the EU has of itself. In the words of a reflection group of experts convened 
by then president of the Commission, Romano Prodi, "there is no essence of Europe, no fixed list 
of European values… no finality to the process of European integration". In conclusion, Manners 
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argues that "if postmodern scholarship teaches us anything it at all, it is that there is no closure, 
finality or completeness to normative theory…"
58  
 
On these accounts of normative power Europe, its legitimacy lies in its transcendence of 
conventional political boundaries and frameworks, in its incorporation into the heart of the EU 
the regard of the non-European Other, and an ability to connect the exercise of normative power 
with a critical inward gaze at Europe's own past. We find echoes here of Sjursen's 
cosmopolitanism, but without any of the ambition of building any unified legal system of 
individual rights at the global level. Legitimacy lies precisely in eschewing such grand designs, 
and emphasizing the role of alterity, difference, mutual recognition and diversity of values and 
world views. 
 
2.3. Legitimacy and social preferences 
 
In the discussion of the EU's normative power so far, its sources of legitimacy have been located 
outside of European society. One scholar who has expressed his scepticism on this idea is Zaki 
Laïdi. Laïdi's argument is that the EU's norms need to be properly grounded in a set of social 
preferences. In this way, the EU's norms are not free-floating, but rather serve the more concrete 
purpose of defending the EU's preferences. In grounding the EU's normative power in European 
society, Laïdi certainly provides us with some insights into the peculiarity of the EU's methods of 
interest intermediation and its aggregation of preferences. However, it is less clear whether he 
manages to make a case for social preferences as a source of legitimacy for the EU's normative 
power. 
  
Laïdi's critique of normative power Europe is based on its divorce from any notion of interest. 
According to Laïdi, "European norms are seen as transcendental values, hovering over 
[surplombant] European societies".
59 Without rooting the EU's norms in European society, there 
is the risk of confusing normative power with "idealist power", or even with an "ideal power", 
"where everything would be about values and principles, and never about interests".
60 Laïdi's 
thesis is that "linking normative power to social preferences may help us get out of the idealistic 
trap and to cross the bridge between material power and social power".
61 In his formulation, 
normative power refers to the creation of norms that bind actors in ways that promote the public 
interest beyond the nation-state. In Laïdi's words, normative power can be defined as  
 
capacity to produce and put in place on a global scale a framework as large as possible of norms 
capable of organizing the world, of disciplining the game of its actors, introducing predictability in 
their actions, developing their sense of collective responsibility, offering to those who embark on 
this path, and notably the weakest ones, the possibility at least in part of making sure that these 
norms apply to all, including the most powerful.
62 
 
The exercise of the EU's normative power amounts to an attempt to build at the global level a 
normative framework that corresponds to the EU's social preferences. Laïdi presents this in terms 
of a confrontation between two visions of world order: the EU's vision of governance through 
norms, and the United State's preference for an order based on the rights of sovereign states.  
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Laïdi believes the result of this confrontation will depend upon the EU's ability to legitimize its 
own vision of governance through norms. Legitimacy, he argues, is critical to the success of the 
whole normative power enterprise. In his words,  
 
Everything rests upon knowing [Toute la question est de savoir] what principle of legitimacy does 
this apparently superior [European and normative] rationality base itself on, especially if it aims 
implicitly to devalue the legitimacy of the national sphere which, after all, has the advantage of 
being validated by a democratic vote…
63 
 
In his answer to this question, Laïdi relies mainly upon sources of legitimacy that belong to the 
EU's complex mechanisms of governance.
64 The EU's vision of global governance is legitimized 
on the basis of three principles: norms are negotiated between asymmetric actors, making this 
kind of governance "a factor of equalization in terms of power"
65; negotiations take place within 
the framework of international institutions, which confer upon their decisions a degree of 
legitimacy; and the norms that result from these negotiations are subject to all concerned, 
regardless of their relative power positions. Obviously, such principles also underpin the EU's 
own governance system. The projection of normative power is about recasting at the global level 
the system of governance that has proven successful at the regional level. In Laïdi's words, "[the 
EU's] priority is… not to export its values in the name of a messianism that is out of favour, but 
to recognize by the international system those preferences that are the basis of its own 
originality".
66 Laïdi's argument rests upon a belief that the distinctiveness and originality of the 
EU project is the basis for the legitimacy of the EU's norms over the "sovereignism" of the US. 
As we will see below, Laïdi's argument in fact rests upon privileging one vision of democracy 
and the aggregation of preferences over others. Drawing out the assumptions underlying his 
argument suggests that the EU's sources of legitimacy may not operate as direct substitutes for the 
legitimacy of nation-states. They imply a marked shift away from popular conceptions of 
legitimacy, towards a neo-corporatist model favoured by the EU and its institutions. This 
legitimizes itself both in terms of its performance and its ability to co-opt special interests into the 
policymaking process. 
 
Laïdi relies upon a basic defence of the EU as a means of solving problems that have proven to be 
beyond the capacity of individual nation states. The legitimacy of the EU is thus a reflection of 
the growing illegitimacy of nation-states.
67 Laïdi makes this argument most clearly in his 
explanation of why Europe favours norm-based governance. The EU, he argues, was originally 
aimed at "decentring the honour of European nations".
68 However, doing away with intra-
European rivalries was only part of the story. More generally, norms serve to restrain the egotism 
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of states in all areas of public policy. Laïdi gives the example of the Euro, where pan-European 
control of monetary policy needed to be complemented by a set of fiscal rules. This was done in 
order to avoid states pursuing inflationary public spending strategies intended to offset the 
consequences of entering the Euro zone. Norms, in such cases, appear as a kind of "meta-value 
destined to domesticate undisciplined states". In Laïdi's words, "the will to circumvent the 
political, or more specifically the constraints of politics, explains in large part the decisive role 
played by the norms in the political construction of Europe".
69 
 
Laïdi also makes a number of arguments concerning the EU's originality as a mechanism for 
aggregating preferences. In his words, "the [European] laboratory presents in effect three 
distinctive traits that enable us to understand why the EU manages perhaps better than other 
regional spaces to channel the social preferences of its citizens in addition to the intermediary of 
nation-states".
70 Firstly, he claims that the fragment of a public sphere that exists in Europe - best 
incarnated in the directly-elected European Parliament - makes the EU more receptive to non-
state interests, promoted by economic, cultural and environmental groups.
71 Secondly, the 
European Commission - by virtue of its non-democratic mandate (i.e. its authority does not reside 
in the 'European people') - is constantly looking for sources of legitimacy that might offset the so-
called 'democratic deficit'. According to Laïdi, this forces the Commission to demonstrate 
concretely that it acts "in the general interest and that [it] is capable of doing so in those areas 
where the social demand for norm-based governance is strong, such as the protection of the 
environment, food security and the precautionary principle".
72 Thirdly, the public financing of 
political parties in Europe results in political life that is relatively less dominated by private 
moneyed interests. Private interests, in other words, are more mediated in Europe than in 
America, which generates greater public trust in political actors. 
 
3. Sources of legitimacy in comparative perspective 
 
Laïdi's claim is that the EU's preference for norm-based governance is legitimized by the EU's 
mechanism for aggregating social preferences, which adequately substitutes itself for the egotism 
of national systems of interest intermediation. It is on this basis that we should accept the superior 
rationality of European norms, and be willing to support the extension of the EU's norm-based 
governance to the global level, in opposition to the US's proposal of a 'sovereignist' international 
system. Laïdi's illustration of the connection between the EU's norms and its social preferences 
does not, however, suggest that the EU has adequately managed to substitute itself for the nation 
state. The model the EU presents us with is of a peculiar type of political formation, whose 
mechanisms of interest intermediation resemble circumscribed and partial forms of what we find 
at the national level. The EU is best thought of as - in Vivien Schmidt's term - a "polity without 
politics". Examining in more detail this "polity without politics" will help us in comparing the 
EU's sources of legitimacy for its norm-based governance with those of nation-states. This third 
section will go on to consider how the other sources of legitimacy - cosmopolitan law and identity 
politics - fare up to closer scrutiny.  
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3.1. Polity without politics 
 
The work of comparative political scientists like Schmidt and Stefano Bartolini have gone some 
way to clarifying the ways in which interests are mediated and aggregated in Europe.
73 The key 
point about the EU's method of interest intermediation is that there is no formal 
institutionalization of interests that combines the interests of individuals and groups with power 
over the decision-making process. Interest intermediation, in other words is technical, not 
political; the EU opens up its decision-making to European citizens as organized interests, not as 
voters.
74 As Schimdt puts it, at the EU level we have government for the people ("through 
effective governance") and government with the people ("through consultation with organized 
interests"); at the national level, in contrast, such forms of government exist but tend to be 
overshadowed by government of and by the people ("through political participation and citizen 
representation").
75 What exists at the EU level is an open system of consultation, with the 
dominance of committee-based representation. Thus, the EU operates on the basis of consensus 
and compromise, and not in terms of partisan differences and political contestation; this is what 
Schmidt means when she writes of "policy without politics".
76 
 
The function played by interest-group participation is overwhelmingly to provide information to 
the Commission and its directorates. In exchange for influence over policy outcomes, the EU 
receives information and secures a measure of legitimacy by openly incorporating certain groups 
into its decision-making procedures. Laïdi claims that this process favours groups traditionally 
ignored by nation-states. In fact, interest groups active in the EU's extended committee system are 
not much different from what we see at the national level. Estimates in the early 1990s indicated 
that around 50% of group were industrial and commercial. Around 20% were agricultural, 
another 20% in the services, and only 5% were public interest groups (environmental, consumer, 
trade unions etc.).
77 Schmidt more recently noted that business interests make up around two 
thirds of all interests represented in Brussels, which is why one scholar labelled the EU's interest 
intermediation process as "elite pluralism".
78 The legitimacy that comes from such involvement 
with special interest groups should be clearly demarcated from the legitimacy of formal 
representation from below.
79We can see parallels here with the relationship between global 
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governance institutions and 'global civil society', where participation also occurs on the basis of 
organized interests lobbying state-level and international authorities. Whilst global civil society 
initiatives tend to emphasise the liberating opportunity for individual participation in global 
processes lying outside of national political communities
80, the EU often presents a neo-
corporatist version of governance. This was evident, for instance, in the landmark White Paper on 
Governance produced by the EU Commission.
81 Schmidt, however, is cautious about labelling the 
EU corporatist. In her view, the EU is "semipluralist in a macrosense of policymaking" and is a 
mixture of pluralism, statism and corporatism in sectoral policymaking at the micro level.
82 
Generally though, the result is that the relationship existing between pan-European institutions 
and European public interest groups is not based on the political rights of the latter, but rather on 
the benevolence of the former and the scope of the privileges it is willing to accord to certain 
organized interests.
83 
 
In fact, we can say that interest intermediation in the EU is a mixture of forms found at the state 
level, but without the primacy of the political sphere - and the decisive claim to authority on the 
part of the populace. Bartolini articulates the point thus: in a democratic nation-state, in contrast 
to the EU,  
 
The holders of different kinds of resources, the politicians and the voters, the bureaucrats and the 
interest representatives, the experts and the judges, continuously exchange their respective assets in a 
situation in which, ultimately, none of them can substract itself from the collectivized decisions that 
fundamentally rest on the principle of political equality. These 'sovereign' political decisions are… 
not the essence of democracy, nor are they the only source of legitimacy, but rather the guarantee of 
the convertibility of a plurality of resources and legitimacy principles.
84 
  
Bartolini notes that it is a hallmark of weak states that the provision of input in terms of requests 
and information is left to the interested actors. In his words, "the open, pluralist, fragmented, and 
consensual model of interest incorporation [in the EU] is the default result of a structural 
weakness of both the central bureaucracy (autonomous information gathering and technical 
evaluation) and of partisan structures (preference identification and aggregation)".
85 The 
Commission's need to secure legitimacy by co-opting specific interests is therefore far from 
being, as it is for Laïdi, another source of legitimacy for the EU. As Bartolini suggests, it is more 
a sign of the Commission's weakness. Vivien Schmidt gives the example of the five NGOs 
invited to speak directly to the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003. These groups were 
brought in as a way of demonstrating the Convention's openness to civil society representatives, 
yet they were at the same time handsomely paid by the Commission. Such top-down cooption 
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reveals above all the Commission's own sense of its lack of popular legitimacy.
86 Viewed in terms 
of its system of interest intermediation, the EU's legitimacy is more a pale reflection of what 
exists at the national level than anything original to the Union.  
 
Laïdi's focus on social preferences helps us determine why the EU opts for some norms and not 
for others, thus overcoming the indeterminism which is a problem for much constructivist 
theorizing.
87 Yet it does not work so effectively as a strategy for legitimizing the EU's normative 
power. Rather than serving as a substitute for national sources of legitimacy, the EU draws upon 
various components of national-level legitimacy, especially the semi-pluralist/corporatist model 
of interest intermediation, but without the supremacy of the political sphere. With the EU lacking 
the kind of internal political vertebration we find at the nation level, we must turn back to the 
external sources of legitimacy highlighted by Sjursen et al and Nicolaïdis - cosmopolitan ethics 
and de-territorialized political community - and ask if they are more effective in legitimizing the 
EU's normative power. 
 
3.2. Ethics, politics and democratic legitimacy 
 
Sjursen argued that the legitimacy of the EU's normative power should be located in its adherence 
to cosmopolitan law. This kind of legitimacy rests upon a thin set of universal principles, tied to 
Habermasian communicative ethics. This thin conception of universality is defined by Andrew 
Linklater as "the ideal that every human being has an equal right to participate in a dialogue to 
determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion which govern global politics".
88 Sjursen 
presents her argument in the manner of seeking a minimum of bias and partiality in the 
identification and operationalization of the EU's norms. However, she does in fact rest her 
argument upon a particular conception of democracy that relativizes the role of popular will and 
places great emphasis on various constraints and checks intended to keep political elites in line. 
At the same time, her focus on cosmopolitan law slips into reducing legitimacy to legality, which 
ignores the role played by both values and politics in generating legitimacy for any set of rules 
and procedures. 
 
Sjursen's conception of democracy can be explored through a look at contemporary problems 
experienced by international law. Mattias Kumm provides a detailed account of the legitimacy 
problems that international law has experienced precisely as a result of its transformation from 
state-authorized treaties into a "firmly structured normative web". This normative web resembles 
to some degree Sjursen's vision of a cosmopolitan legal order and allows us to explore problems 
the EU faces in legitimizing itself. Kumm locates the origins of international law's legitimacy 
crisis in three developments. The first is an expansion in the subject matter of international law 
that has introduced uncertainty regarding the role and remit of national jurisdictions. In Kumm's 
words, "international law… has been the handmaiden of denationalization by having generated an 
increasingly dense set of substantive rules that directly concern questions traditionally decided by 
national legal processes".
89 The second problem is that the procedures through which 
international law has expanded its scope have weakened greatly the link between the consent of 
states and the obligations they face under international law. International law can no longer be 
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understood as derived from the will of states i.e. through treaty-ratification or through customary 
international law that reflects the evolution of state practice over time.
90 Instead, powers are being 
delegated to treaty-making bodies in ways that mean international law is being made 
independently of states. Crudely, we can say that the authors of international law are increasingly 
becoming divorced from those subjected to it; law-makers and law-takers no longer coincide.
91 
Thirdly, Kumm argues that there is less flexibility in the interpretation and enforcement of 
international law, making international law far more of a constraint on domestic political and 
legal processes than in the past.
92 
 
This expansion of international law is sustained by a normative consensus. The quasi-
judicialization of global trade law within the WTO has been possible because of the normative 
agreement between states about the desirability in general of free trade and open markets. 
Disagreements on tariff rates and market access cannot obscure the overarching agreement on the 
merits of market capitalism. Major innovations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
also rest upon a normative attachment to basic principles of human rights. In this respect, 
"international law as governance" as Kumm calls it has been possible only as a result of what 
Fukuyama dubbed "the end of history".
93 Legitimacy problems suffered by international law must 
therefore derive from a lack of participation and representation, so-called "input legitimacy".
94 
Kumm writes that 
 
International law as governance blurs the distinction between national and international law. Both 
with regard to the scope of its subject matter and the processes used to generate, interpret and apply 
it, it is no longer apparent what structurally distinguishes international law from national law, except 
of course, for one central point: international law is not generated within the institutional framework 
of liberal constitutional democracy and does not allow for a central role for electoral supervision. In 
this sense it lacks democratic pedigree.
95 
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The implications of Kumm's argument for the legitimacy of the EU's normative power is clear. 
Notwithstanding the normative consensus that might exist concerning the basic rights embodied 
in cosmopolitan law, it suffers from the same problem as contemporary international law in 
general. It appears as an imposition from above - as an alien force - since there is no way in 
which those subject to the law can also be the authors of the law. Defining the EU's normative 
power in terms of cosmopolitan law therefore raises the same questions of "democratic deficit" 
that have become a central issue in the debate around the constitutionalization of Europe. 
European law, particularly since the ground-breaking decision of the German Constitutional 
Court in 1993, has been troubled by its lack of democratic legitimacy.
96 As Kumm notes, "there 
are striking similarities between contemporary international law and European law that go right to 
the legitimacy issue".
97 Looking at Sjursen's argument, we find that she resolves this problem by 
making explicit her understanding of the cosmopolitan legal framework as external to the EU, 
operating as a constraint (a mechanism of "self-binding") that forces consistency in elite rhetoric 
and action.
98 Legal principles thus serve the purpose of disciplining and constraining the action of 
the EU. On a Rousseauian reading of democracy, this argument is anti-democratic. However, it is 
consistent with a liberal view of democracy as a system constructed around the need to constrain 
political power and ensure the responsiveness of political elites and state bureaucracies to their 
constituents/clients. This constitutionalist view relativizes the importance of political self-
determination, in favour of an emphasis on checks and balances. For all her commitment to 
value-neutral theory, we can see that Sjursen resolves the tensions at the heart of her attachment 
to cosmopolitan law by privileging a liberal reading of democracy over those more closely 
aligned to the concept of popular sovereignty.
99 
 
Another difficulty in this particular enterprise of legitimizing the EU's normative power lies in the 
content of the universalism Sjursen identifies as the right standard against which to judge the 
EU's actions. Sjursen opts for the "thin universalism" of Habermasian communicative ethics 
mentioned above. She argues that anything other than the higher order norms of equality, 
freedom, solidarity, self-realization and human dignity brings cultural bias into the normative 
equation. Sjursen distinguishes between norms as values and norms as rights. The former are 
culturally bound, the latter universalizable. The trouble with this distinction is that it empties 
universal categories of much of their content. Instead of thinking of universalism in terms of 
concrete outcomes and visions for the future that demand a transformation of society, Sjursen's 
thin universalism is essentially procedural. It is about how individuals should relate to each other, 
rather than about what individuals can achieve when they act in concert. Such is the message 
from another member of the ARENA group of Habermasians, E. Erikson, who argues that the EU 
should follow a principle of universalization that is deontological instead of axiological. In 
Erikson's words, this "question of fairness… is concerned with what we are obliged to do when 
our actions have consequences for others". In his own account of Habermasian discourse ethics, 
Andrew Linklater draws out the meaning of the distinction between deontology and axiology. He 
argues that "discourse ethics sets out procedures to be followed… it does not offer putative 
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solutions to substantial moral debates, envisage historical endpoints or circulate political 
blueprints".
100 Linklater adds that in this normative framework, "the emphasis shifts away from 
universalisable conceptions of the good life to the procedural universals which need to be in place 
before true dialogue can be said to exist in any social encounter". Erikson's distinction between 
deontology and axiology fits with Sjursen's distinction between rights and values. Fighting over 
what meaning we give to the good life and what plans we have for the future is relegated to the 
realm of political partisanship and zero-sum games between competing interests; Sjursen's 
"higher order norms" are concerned not with specific values but the framework that can 
accommodate different values and ensure mutual respect and recognition. 
 
Such a thin universalism, however, is unlikely to generate much legitimacy. By reducing 
universalism to a set of procedural rules, Sjursen falls into the trap of equating legitimacy with 
legality. However, rules do not have any legitimacy of their own: their legitimacy depends upon 
an underlying set of values. The legitimacy of the law, we can say, is performatively generated. 
As Claus Offe has argued, it is not laws themselves which are legitimate but the purposes which 
underlie them. In his words, "their acceptance must depend not upon what they are, but what the 
consequences or likely results of their application are". Thus, "the ability of governments actually 
to produce ends… may consequently be considered as one major determinant of what we have 
called the acceptance of the legitimating rules that, as formal rules, have themselves to be 
legitimized".
101 Sjursen's distinction between rights and values thus isolates law (rights) from its 
own source of legitimacy (values).   
 
Put another way, the higher order norms Sjursen cites (equality, freedom etc.) only become 
meaningful when they are situated within society. However, as soon as we do this, it becomes 
clear that such concepts are highly contested, with social forces lining up against different 
interpretations of these rights. As Martha Finnemore has argued, it is hardly realistic to imagine 
that a term such as equality can be defined without disagreement over its meaning. When we 
speak of equality, do we mean equality of opportunity, or of outcomes? The historical 
confrontation between social versus liberal conceptions of democracy hangs in part on what 
meaning we give to equality.
102 As Finnemore argues, such contestation over the meaning of 
"higher order norms" is the essence of politics: "normative contestation is in large part what 
politics is all about; it is about competing values and understandings of what is good, desirable, 
and appropriate in our collective communal life".
103 The legitimacy accorded to these rights, and 
the procedural rules that accompany them, thus inheres not in the rules themselves but in the 
political sphere that gives content to these rights. Only by situating the rights of equality, liberty 
etc. within a particular vision of the social order do they become meaningful, and serve as sources 
of legitimacy. The stability of Western liberal democracies rests upon a normative consensus 
around what meaning we give to these basic rights. The vitality of political life depends upon the 
extent to which these meanings are contested. By confining her notion of legitimacy to the sphere 
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of cosmopolitan law, Sjursen is able to avoid the sphere of interest-based politics which she views 
as biased and culturally bound. However, in doing so, she reduces legitimacy to legality. How 
much legitimacy can be gained for the EU from the "thin universalism" of communitarian ethics 
is thus open to some doubt. 
 
3.3. Identity politics: power without purpose? 
 
Somewhat similar problems are confronted by attempts to legitimize the EU's normative power 
either through a post-colonial agenda of other-regardedness and atonement, or via the open-
endedness and lack of finality distinctive of postmodern approaches. However, the main problem 
here is that the concept of normative power is stripped of any transcendental purpose. From the 
perspective of postmodern theory and identity politics, this is a step forward. Yet it makes it 
impossible for normative power to function as a solution to the problem it was meant to address - 
the crisis in the Idea of Europe and the ongoing search for meaning in the process of European 
integration. 
 
Returning briefly to the discussion of democracy, it is worth noting some overlap between 
Sjursen and Nicolaïdis. In Nicolaïdis' vision of post-colonial atonement, European citizenship is 
recast not as a right of participation but as a set of duties to others. And by implying that non-
European others have a right to judge European actions, we can guess that Europeans, to 
paraphrase Andrew Linklater, are not at liberty to decide the extent of their moral duties.
104 The 
freedom of the political community to determine its own ends is in this case foreclosed by the 
ethical injunction to atone for past wrongs. We can see this ethical injunction also at work with 
cosmopolitan theory. Sjursen waters down her conception of universalism in such a way as to 
ensure that her norms are fully universalizable. However, the equal application of a set of norms 
is quite different from a consideration of their origins and what relationship they have with a 
given political community. Even the most egalitarian of norms can be imposed from above in a 
tyrannical manner - this is what Kant meant when he wrote of the possible tyranny of ethics.
105 
Both Nicolaïdis and Sjursen privilege the content of norms over the manner by which they are 
constituted. Yet as the German Constitutional Court warned in 1993, this can present real 
problems of democratic legitimation. 
 
On the question of normative power and its purpose, Nicolaïdis' project of legitimizing the EU's 
normative power by recasting it as a "post-colonial ethos" can be thought of in terms of identity 
politics. The basic tenets of identity politics are threefold: the "hybridization" of identity, the 
underlying contingency of all identities, and an emphasis on practical - as opposed to theoretical - 
identity.
106 Much of what passes for identity politics is closely tied to Habermasian reasoning, and 
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so overlaps with cosmopolitanism. However, the emphasis on contingency and a deep-seated 
rejection of any finality or definitiveness in the process of identity formation and mutual 
recognition has much in common with the postmodern perspectives cited here. Derrida's famous 
claim that identity is never quite identical with itself, and always contains within itself its own 
alterity/otherness, is in fact a central tenet of identity politics.
107 The problem of normative power 
Europe as a kind of politics of recognition inscribed into the EU's foreign policy is that it 
ultimately fails to respond to the search for meaning which is what drove scholars, analysts and 
policymakers towards the idea of normative power in the first place. In this way, it fails in its 
quest for legitimacy since legitimacy is closely bound up with this search for meaning. Identity 
politics refuses the idea - integral to political life as we came to understand it in the twentieth 
century - of creating from scratch new collective identities which subsumed individuals entirely. 
What we see is the promotion of one kind of politics over another. In order to draw out the 
consequences of this, it is useful to briefly sketch a comparison of these two kinds of politics.  
 
The modern politics of representation was dedicated to the creation of something new, of 
bringing into existence that which did not exist previously. This kind is the politics of the 'New 
Man' which so marked the twentieth century and which dominated political theory and 
philosophy from the thirties to the sixties. As Alain Badiou has written, what defined this epoch 
and this type of politics was the belief in the "non-naturalness of the human subject", and that "a 
subject is of the order not of what is but of what happens".
108 In the famous words of the 
Internationale, "the earth shall rise on new foundations". The postmodern politics of recognition, 
otherwise known as identity politics, is concerned with recognizing that which already exists. It 
refers above all to "struggles to overcome an imposed identity and to gain recognition of a non-
imposed identity".
109 These two kinds of politics are obviously opposed to each other: identity 
politics sees the politics of the New Man as the embodiment of totalizing identities imposed on 
marginal groups through violent acts of coercion and assimilation. We can see some of this 
opposition at work in Nicolaidis' notion of post-colonial atonement. European imperialism is 
conceived of as the imposition of Europe's identity onto the rest of the world; European thought is 
dominated with the search for singularity and all the attendant risks of domination and 
objectifization of others that this entails. The EU's normative power is therefore conceived as the 
assertion of a politics of recognition over the erstwhile politics of the 'New Man' that wrought 
such havoc across Europe during the twentieth century. 
 
The trouble with the concept of normative power is that it was conceived as part of an attempt to 
generate meaning for the European project; it was an attempt to make post-Cold War European 
integration meaningful. Legitimacy is crucially about providing justifications for the exercise of 
power: it is power with purpose.
110 These justifications can take the form of narratives, often 
teleological, such as functionalism in the case of European integration. They can also come in the 
form of projects to create something new: the purpose of power understood in terms of the 
achievements that are within the reach of humans acting in concert. This creative desire for 
meaning, for making something in the world and of the world, which is the anthropological core 
of modern political life from Marx to Malraux, is rejected by identity politics. It is even more 
explicitly rejected by postmodernists who refuse to conceive on any finality, any boundary, and 
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anything definitive at all. In the words of Jean-Francois Lyotard's postmodern rallying cry: "we 
have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one… let us wage a war on 
totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable, let us activate the difference".
111 Tully states 
explicitly that the difference between identity politics and what came before it is that the former 
does not involve "struggles for the definitive recognition of an authentic, autonomous or self-
realizing identity… no such fixed identity exists". He goes on: the "ideal of a definitive 
recognition… is just as much a chimera as the former impartial liberal identity and the uniform 
national identity".
112 Yet in so far as legitimizing the EU's normative power means providing an 
account of the EU's role in the world i.e. in giving a 'normative' purpose to the EU's power, 
identity politics does not provide the EU with the requisite ideational and political resources. Its 
version of legitimacy undercuts its own foundations and leaves the normative power Europe 
project adrift in a sea of meaningless flux. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the question of the EU's normative power through the concept of 
legitimacy. It has argued that normative power Europe has had difficulty in justifying itself on its 
own terms, with both scholars and analysts noting that what passes for 'normal' in the EU's eyes 
might not be normal for everyone else. The result of this has been a search for new sources of 
legitimacy for the EU's normative project. This paper has analyzed three sources in detail - 
cosmopolitan law, identity politics and a set of European social preferences. Each source of 
legitimacy draws upon different understandings of political community, authority and democracy, 
which signals an underlying lack of clarity concerning the EU as a political formation. The paper 
has also sketched out very briefly some of the problems confronting the sources of legitimacy 
relied upon by these various approaches. These problems are threefold: (1) the notion that the 
EU's "polity without politics" can be a distinctive source of legitimacy for the EU's vision of 
governance-through-norms; (2) the conflation of legitimacy with legality and a disregard for 
political processes of contestation that any set of norms must undergo in order to be legitimized; 
(3) a rejection of the purpose attached to power in the name of eschewing totalizing visions of 
European singularity and finality. If these sources of legitimacy are indeed so weak, then this 
poses a problem for the EU in its desire to assert itself as an actor in world politics. As David 
Beetham has argued, legitimacy is not the "icing on the cake of power" applied after the baking is 
over; legitimacy is the yeast that enters the dough and makes the bread what it is.
113 If legitimacy 
is constitutive of power, as Beetham suggests, then it is perhaps in its sources of legitimacy that 
we find the limits of the EU's normative power. 
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